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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2007 
FRED T. HARJ.VION, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL .AUTOMOBILE INSUR,.ANCE 
COJ.VIP .ANY, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supren~e Cmtt·t o.f A.tJpeals 
of Virg·inia: 
Your Petitioner, Fred T. I-Iarmon, respectfully represents 
unto the Court that he is aggrieved by a final judgment en-
tered by the Circuit Court of Accomack County, ·virginia~ on 
the 22d day of February, 1938, in the above styled cause, 
said final judgment having been entered sustaining a de-
murrer filed by the defendant to the plaintiff's notice of 
motion for judgment. 
Your Petitioner is advised that in sustaining said den1ur1·er, 
the Circuit Court erred to the prejudice of your Petitioner; 
which error warrants and calls for a review and a reversal 
of said judgment by this Honorable Court. Your Petitioner 
herewith submits a transcript of the record of the trial of said 
notice of motion for judgment in the lower Court, and as is 
shown thereby, this· case is now before the Court upon the 
plaintiff's notice of motion for judgment, defendant's de-
murrer thereto, and the Circuit Court's judgment in sustain-
ing said demurrer. 
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A copy of the original notice of motion for judgment filed 
by your Petitioner, together ~ith "Exhibit B", will be found 
on pages 1 to 5, inclusive, of the record hereto attached. A 
copy of the defendant's demurrer will be found on page 5 of 
said record, and a copy 'of the Court's final judgment sus-
taining said demur1·er will be found on pages 5 and 6 of the 
record. The. original policy of insurance sued on, by con-
sent of parties entered of rec9rc;l, is filed with the record !n 
this case. 
An examination of the record-notice of motion for judg-
ment, "Exhibit B" filed therewith, and original policy of in-
surance will disclose that on the 17th day of lVIay, 1933, the 
defendant insurance company issued a certain policy, No. 
490-095, in favor of the Plaintiff, in consideration of the pay-
ment of the pren1ium on the san1e by the plaintiff, said 
premium being $23.00, and said policy was to be in effect and 
continue for a period of one year; that the liability of the 
defendant under said ·policy of insurance 'vas as follo,vs: 
public liability for one person, $10,000.00; public. liHbility for 
one accident, $20,000.00; property dan1age, $5,000.00; the au-
tomobile described in said insurance policy was a l!,ord of four 
cylinders,. one and one-half tons stake truck, model year 1931, 
Engine No. A 4283170, a:t;Id said automobile was owned solely 
by the plaintiff. The record further discloses that on the 
6th day of December, 1933, the aforesaid automobile, de-
scribed in the policy aforesaid, was in a collision on tl1e public 
highway in the State of Delaware with au auton1obile owned 
and operated by Webb Packing Company, of Crisfield, J\ifary-
land; that shortly thereafter a report of said accident was 
made to the nearest authorized agent of the defendant com-
pany, and as a result of said report to said defondant com-
pany an investigation of the collision was made by the duly 
authorized agent of the defendant company. 
That on the 7th day of May, 1934, the vVebb Packing Com~ 
pany and one Millard C. Watson instituted suits in l~ew Cas-
tle County, Delaware, against the plaintiff in this case, Fred 
T. Harmon, and Forest L. Harmon, trading as Fred ~'. Jlar-
mon & Brother; that on · August 20~ 1934, processes were 
issued in said suits, directed· to the Sheriff of l{ent County, 
Delaware, and on the 4th day of September, 1934-, said pro-
cesses were served upon Charles H. Grantland, Secretary 
of State of the State of Delaware, and oi1 the · day of 
October, 1934, copies of said processes were sent to and re-
ceived by Fred T. Harmon and Forest L. Harmon, partners 
trading as Fred T. Harmon & Brother from the plaintiffs ; 
that the plaintiff iu this case failed, in accordance with the 
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provisions of said insurance policy, to send san1e to defendant 
company. 
The record further discloses that on January 31, 1935, judg-
ments were rendered in the Delaware Court in the abo-ve 
styled suits against the plaintiff in this case, Fred T. Harmon, 
and his brother, Forest L. Harmon, trading as Fred T. Har-
mon & Brother, for the sums of $5,600.00 and $572.50, re-
spectively. q ~fM.\t . 
That on the ~th day o ctober, 1937, orders were entered 
by Judge Richards, a. m her of the Superior Court of the 
State of Delaware, in the Superior Court of the State of Dela-
ware, in and for New Castle County, directing the Prothono-
tary of New Castle County to mark the judgnwnts aforesaid 
vacated on the record. 
Previous to the said orders vacating said juclg1nents, suits 
had been instituted. in the Circuit Court for the County of 
Accomack, Virginia, against Fred T. Harmon and Forest L. 
Harmon, partners trading as Fred T. Harmon & Brother, by 
Webb Packing Company and ~Iillard C. vVatson, respectively, 
alleging the two judgn1euts above mentioned as the bases of 
said suits in the said County of Accomack and State of Vir-
ginia, residence of the defendants; that on August 25, 1937, 
after the aforesaid judgments in New Castle County, Dela-
ware, ag·ainst the plaintiff in this case and his brother, Forest 
L. Harmon, were ordered vacated by the Superior Court for 
the State or Delaware, the Salne processes as originally S< .. nt 
out from New Castle County, Delaware, to th~"J defendant 
(plaintiff in this case) and his brother, Forest L. Harmon, 
were again sent to this plaintiff and his brother, Forest L. 
Harn1on, and these processes 'vere, on the 26th day of August, 
1937, sent to the defendant in this case at Roanoke, Virginia, 
as will fully appear by reference to "Exhibit B", on pages 4 . 
and 5 of record, and on August 31, 1937, P.R. Thornburg, _rep-
resenting himself as the defendant's legal departnwnt, re-
turned said processes to the plaintiff in this case, denying 
coverage to this plaintiff with respect to said accident. 
It further appears from the record in this case that by 
reason of the failure and refusal of the defendant con1pany 
to recognize its obligation, as set forth in the policy herein 
sued on, to defend in the narr1e· of the assured any suits which 
might be brought against the assured (plaintiff in this case) 
on account of said accident, the assured (plaintiff in this 
case) was forced to retain and employ counsel, both in Vir-
ginia and Delaware, to vacate said judgments in Delaware 
and have dismissed the suits in the Circuit Court of the 
County of Accomack,. Virginia, and in so doing incurred ex-
r·-·~-~-- -- ~-- ---
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penses, together with attorneys' fees, to the extent of $750.00; 
that this expense 'vould not have been incurred had defendant 
company not violated the agreement which it had unde.rtaken, 
_ as will fully appear by an examination of the policy afore-
said. 
DEMURRER .. 
The defendant insurance company :filed its demurrer to said 
notice of motion for judgment, stating the grounds of de-
murrer to be as follows : 
1. ''Because the terms of the policy of insurance sued on 
are not alleged in the notice of motion for judgment, nor is 
the original policy or a -sworn copy thereof filed with said 
notice of motion for judgment. 
2. ''Because said notice of motion for judgment upon its 
face shows that the plaintiff 'failed, in accordance with one of 
the_ provisions of said insurance policy', to forward to the 
defendant company the copies of the processes sent to the 
plaintiff on the day of October, 1934, in the suit at that 
time pending in New Castle County, in the State of Dela-
ware, in favor of Webb Packing Company, et al., against said 
plaintiff and another.'' 
On consideration of the demurrer, the Court on the 22d day 
of February, 1938 (see R.ecord, pages 7 and 8), overruled the 
demurrer on the first ground, and sustained it on the second 
ground, that is to say, the plaintiff, in sending the processes 
. to the defendant insurance company on the 26th day of Au-
gust, 1937, did not comply with the provisions of said insur-
ance policy. 
There is only one question involved in this case. 
The policy, page 3 and paragraph 17, provides as follows: 
"Upon the occurrence of an accident covered by this policy, 
. involving injuries to persons or damage to the property of 
others, the Assured shall ~ive immediate notice thereof, with 
the fullest information obtainable at the time, by telephone, 
telegraph or letter to the home office of the Company at Co-
lumbus, Ohio, or to the nearest known ag-ent of the Company .. 
If any claim is made on account of such accident the Assured· 
shall give notice thereof with full particulars. If, thereafter, 
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suit is brought against the Assured to enforce such claim, the 
Assured shall immediately forward to the Company every 
summons or every process served upon the Assured, and 
the Company will, at its own cost, defend such suit in the 
name, and on behalf, of the Assured.'' 
Since, for the purpose of this argument, all allegations in 
the notice of motion for judgment are to be taken and ac-
cepted as true, it may be sta.ted as a fact that the plaintiff 
made a report of said accident to the nearest authorized 
agent of said defendant company, and the defendant com- , 
pany, through its authorized agent, made an investigation of 
the .collision. This fully complies with the first sentence of 
the paragraph. No claim 'vas made by anyone on account of 
said accident, except and until suits were instituted in New 
Castle County, Delaware, on May 7, 1934, and no process 
issued in said suits until .August 20, 1934, and not until Sep-
tember 4, 1934, was such process served on the Secretary of 
. State of the State of Delaware, and not until the day 
of October, 1934, were copies of said processes forwarded 
to the plaintiff in the instant case. So that if the plaintiff in 
the instant case failed to ·do anything required by the policy 
or. in any way excused the defendant company of liability 
under the policy, it must be by having omitted something· re-
quired of him by virtue of the third and last sentence in the 
paragraph which reads: 
"If, thereafter, suit is brought against the Assured to en-
force such claim, the Assured. shall immediately forward to 
the Company every summons or every process served upon' 
the Assured, and the Company will at its own cost defend 
such suit in the name, and on behalf, of the Assured.'' 
It is necessary, of course, to construe this paragraph and 
determine its real meaning. Will the plaintiff in the instant 
case forfeit all right under the policy herein sued on for 
failure to send to defendant company a process issued over 
five months after suit 'vas instituted and forwarded by mail, 
and relieve the defendant company of its liability under the 
policy? It must be remembered that this process was not a 
valid procesR, as the Court in Delaware so declared and 
vacated the judgment based thereon. A second effort was . 
n1ade t(J hold the plaintiff in the instant case liable in Delaware 
for the collision of December. 6, 1933, and the sa·me processes 
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were forwarded by 1nail to the plaintiff in the instant case, 
and he immediately forwarded the processes to the defendant 
cmupany (see "Exl1ibit B", pp. 4 and 5, Record), and on 
.• :\ugust 31, 1937, 'vas advised by the defendant con1pany that 
it ''denied coverage'' with respect to said accident. 
The purpose of the provision of the policy heretofore 
quoted was to protect the defendant co1npany from being held 
liable for any accident or collision iu a suit 'vhich it had no 
knowledge of and which it had not had an opportunity to 
investigate. The defendant company suffered no loss and 
incurred no additional liability for failure of plaintiff in the 
instant case to send to the defendant company the invalid 
processes issued in Delaware and forwarded by n1ail to plain-
tiff on the day of October, 1934; it had made an in-
vestigation and was in possession of all facts and prepared to 
defend suit; true it is that judgments were awarded on said 
processes in Delaware, but at the instance of the plaintiff in 
the instant case, at his own cost, said judgments were vacated 
by the proper Court in Delaware, and then the defendant 
cmnpany had full opportunity to defend the cases when heard 
ab initio. It sustained no injury and suffered no loss whatever 
by failure of the plaintiff in the i1~stant case to send it the 
processes first issued out of Delaware. The same processes 
were retunwd and forwarded to defendant con1pany. 
The Court in the instant case, in construing the provision 
of the policy heretofore set out, followed the ruling in Assur-
a'nce Corporation v. Perkins, 169 ~1aryland R.eport, 269, and 
held that regardless of whether assurer sustained any pe-
cuniary loss or prejudice by the failure of the assured. to for-
ward to the con1pany or its duly authorized agent the docu-
ments served upon the assured, the failure of the assured 
to send to the assurer the processes received by the insured 
in October, 1934, was a failure on his part to fulfill the con-
dition upon which performance by the i.nsurer is dependent, 
and was a breach of contract which denied the assured a right 
of recovery on the contract. 
We submit, though we cannot find a. Virginia authority 
directly in point, that this construction is entirely too strict 
and rigid. We submit a reasonable construction should be 
given to contracts of this character, and "rhether or not the 
forwarding of the processes on August 26, 1937, to the as-
surer was a reasonable compliance with the provision of the 
policy was a question \vhich 've \vere entitled to have sub-
. mitted to a jury. 
H'ltnter v. Hollingsworth, 183 S. E., p. 508. 
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In Woodmen .Accident .Association v. Pratt (Nebraska), 
89 Amer. State Report, page 777, on page 782, the Court 
says: 
"'This Court has frequently said that forfeiture clauses in 
contracts of the kind under consideration are not to be en-
forced literally, except such construction be found necessary 
to conform to the obvious intention of the parties.'' 
Quoting from Phoenix Ins'u,rooce Co. v. Holcombe, 57 Neb. 
622, the Court further says : 
"Forfeitures," says Sullivan, J., "are not favored, and 
in contracts of insurance a construction resulting in a loss 
of the indemnity for which the insured has contracted will 
not be adopted except to give effect to the obvious intention 
of· the parties. '' 
Continuing, the Court further quotes from the same case: 
''In respect of the rule of construing provisions in a con-
tract of insurance for notice of accident and injury or loss 
or damage, and proof of the same to be given 'forthwith' or 
'immediately' or within _a stipulated time, the authorities are 
not entirely harmonious, and yet from the examination we 
have been able to make in the limited time at our command, 
the great weight of authority is to the effect that exercise 
of due diligence and reasonable effort on the part of the in-
sured to meet the requirements thus imposed, to be determined 
under all the circumstances as disclosed in each individual 
case, is deemed a compliance with such provisions, although 
not within the time according to the strict letter of the terms 
used in defining the same.'' 
In Ward v. Maryla;nd Cas'ttalty Company (New Hamp-
shire), 93 American State R.eport, at page 514, the Court, 
on page 515, says : 
''The defendants'· liability depends in part upon the an-
swer to the question whether the plaintiffs gave them 'im-
mediate' notice in writing of the occurrence of the accident, 
the claim made on account of it, and the suit that was brought 
to enforce the claim. This involves an ascertainment of the 
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n1eaning of the 'vorcl 'immediately', as used in the policy. 
The word when relating to time is defined in the Century 
Dictionary as follows: 'Without any time intervening; with-
out any delay; present; instant; often used like similar ab-
~olute expressions, with less strictness than the literal mean-
ing requires; as, an im1nediate answer.' It is evident that 
the word was not used in this contract in its literal sense. 
It would generally be impossible to give notice in writing of 
a fact the instant it occurred. It c.annot be presumed that 
the parties intended to introduce intd the contract a. provision 
that would render the contract nug·atory. As 'immediately' 
was understood by them, it allowed the intervention of a 
period of time between the occurrence of the fact and the 
giving of notice, more or less lengthy, according to the cir-
cumstances. The objec.t of the notice was one of the cir-
cumstances to be considered. · If it was to enable the de-
fendants to take steps for their protection that must neces-
sarily be taken soon after the occurrence of the fact, of which 
notice was to be given, a briefer time would be required to 
render the notice imn1ediately according to the understand-
ing of the parties than would be required if the object could 
he equally well obtained after considerable delay. For 
example, a delay of weeks in giving notic.e of the commence-
. ment of the employee's suit against the plaintiffs might not 
prejudice the defendants in preparing for a defense of the 
action, while a n1uch shorter delay in giving notice of the acci-
dent mig·ht prevent the1n from aseertaining the truth about it. 
The parties intended by the language used that the notice in 
each case should be given so· soon after the fact transpired, 
that in view of all the circumstances it would be reasonably 
immed~ate. If a notice is given with due diligence under 
the circumstances of the case and without unnecessarv and un-
reasonable delay, it will answer the requirements of the con-
tract.'' 
In support of this proposition, numerous cases are cited. 
To san1e effect is Frank Parrnalee Co. v. Aetna Life l'IU>. Co. 
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit), 166 Fed. 741. 
The Court in next to last paragraph says: 
''But assuming that the summons was one that, under con-
dition two, should have been in1n1ediately forwarded to de~ 
fendant in error, the averments of the declaration still show, 
in our judgment, a substantial cotnpliance with the contract; 
for the defendant in error was put in full information of all 
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facts transpiring up to that time-had all the data upon 
' which to base its judgment as to what defense might be made 
to the vVhelock action, and how the defense could be conducted. 
In contracts of this kind, to escape .liability, the insurer must 
show that the breach is' something more than a mere technical 
departure from the letter of the bond-that it is a departure 
that results in substantial prejudice and injury to its position 
in the matter." 
To support this position a number of authorities are cited. 
The facts in the case above are in many respects similar to 
the case at bar. The as·surer, defendant Company, im-
mediately upon the collision was notified by assured so that 
it might make an investigation of the facts connected with the 
collision, determine the responsibility for the collision, and 
generally prepare itself for any defense; the assurer availed 
~tself ·of the opportunity to make. the investigation and to de-
termine who was responsible for the collision. The assurer 
sustained 'no loss or injury by reason of the failur·e of the 
plaintiff in this case to send the process first received by him 
to assurer; it received the second process, which was exactly 
like the first, and only made reply ''denying coverage''. 
In conclusion, therefore, we submit that for the reasons 
stated, the. Circuit Court erred in sustaining the demurrer 
of the defendant Company. Your petitioner accordingly 
prays that he may be awarded a writ of error and supersedeas 
to said judgment; that the same may be reversed and set 
aside; and that a new trial may be granted your Petitioner 
iri conformity with the opinion handed down by this Honorable 
Court; that your Petitioner may have such other relief as may 
be proper, and that the case may be remanded to the Circuit 
Cou.rt of. the County of Accomack. 
Your petitioner respectfully states to the Court that a copy 
of this petition has been delivered to J. Brooks 1\iapp, one 
of the attorneys for the defendant Company, who tried this 
case in the Circuit Court for the County of Accomack, and 
that said copy was delivered to said J. Brooks J\IIapp on 
the 17th day of J u.ne, 1938. 
Given under my hand this 17th day of June, 1938 . 
. FRED T: HARMON, 
By GUNTER & GUNTER, 
GEORGE L. DOUGHTY, 
JEFF F. WALTER, 
Counsel. 
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'"\V e, the undersigned Attorneys, practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of :Virginia, do hereby certify that in our 
opinion it is proper that the decision and judgment referred 
to in the foregoing petition be reviewed by the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia. 
J nne 17, 1938. 
Received June 18, 1938. 
Received June· 27, 1938. 
BEN T. GUNTER, 
GEOR.GE L. DOUGHTY, 
B. T. GUNTER, JR. 
l\1. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
C. V. SPRATLEY. . 
W tit of error and s~tpersedeas. Bond, $300.00. 
July 13, 1938. 
C. VERNON SPRATLEY. 
Received July 13, 1938. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA:. 
Pleas before the. Circuit Court for the County of Acco-
mack, on Tuesday, the 22nd day of February, A. D., 1938. 
BE IT REMEMBERED, That heretofore, to-wit: On 
January 13, A. D., 1938, a Notice of l\{otion for Judgment 
of Fred T. Harmon, plaintiff, against Farn1 Bureau Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company, defendant, was returned to 
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the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Accomack County, 
Virginia, and duly filed, which Notice of Motion for J udgmen.t 
is in the following words and .figures, to-wit: 
To the Farm Bureau 1\Iutnal Automobile Insurance Company: 
Take notice that on 1\'Ionclay, },ebruary 7, 1938, same being 
the first day of the February term of the Circuit Court for 
the County of Accomack, Virginia, at 10 o'clock A. lVL, or 
as soon thereafter as the Court can conveniently hear the 
· same, the undersigned will 'moi'e the said Co1,rrt to enter up 
judgment against you in the sum of $750.00, for this, to-wit: 
That on the 17th day of :.May, 1933, you, through your au-
thorized representative, issued to the undersigned a policy 
of insurance, being your No. 490-095; said policy of insurance, 
in consideration of the payment of the premium on same, said 
premiun1 being $23.00, was to be in effect and continue for 
a period of one year; that your liability under said insurance 
policy was as follows: public liability for one person, $10,.; 
000.00; public liability for one accident, $20,000.00; property 
damage, $5,000.00; the original of said insurance policy is 
filed with the original of this notice of 1notion for judgment, 
1narked "Exhibit A"; that the automobile described in said 
insurance policy was a Ford of four cylinders, one and one-
half tons stake truck, model year 1931, Engine No. A 4283170; 
that said automobile was owned solely by the undersigned; 
That on ti1e 6th day of D"~cember, 1933, the 3aid 
page 2 ~ automobile mentioned and described in said insur-
ance policy was· in a collision on the public high-
'vays of the. State of Delaware with an automobile owned and 
operated by Webb Packing Company, of Crisfield, lVIaryland; 
that shortly thereafter a report of said accident was made 
to the nearest authorized agent of your Company; that as re-
sult thereof an investigation was made by your duly au-
thorized agent of the said collision; 
That on the 7th day of 1\iay, 1934, suits were brought by 
Webb Packing Company and Millard C. Watson against Fred 
T. Harmon and Forest L. Harmon, trading as Fred T. Har-
mon & Brother, on account of damages resulting {rom said 
'accident; that said suits were instituted in New Castle County, 
in the State of Delaware, and the processes on same were 
issued on August 20, 1934, and directed to the' Sheriff of I{ent 
County, Delaware; that on the 4th day of September, A. n:, 
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1934, said processes were served upon Charles H. Grantland, 
Secretary of State of the State of Delaware; that on the 
. day of October, 1934, copies of said processes were sent to and 
received by Fred T. Harmon and Forest L. Harmon, part-
ners trading as Fred T. Harmon & Brother from the plain-
tiffs; that the undersigned failed, in accordance with one of 
the provisions of said insurance policy, to send same to you; 
That on the 31st day of January, 1935, judgments were 
rendered against Fred T. Harmon and Forest L. Harmon, · 
trading as Fred T. Harmon & Brother, for the sum of $5,-
600.00 and $57~.50, respec~h ·n the above entitled sui.ts; 
That on the ith day of r, 1937, orders were entered 
in the Superior Court of t e State of Delaware, in and for 
New Castle County, directing the Prothonotary of New Castle 
County to mark the aforesaid judgments vacated on the record 
by Judge Richards, a member of the Superior Court of the· 
State of Delaware; 
That previous to the said orders vacating said judgments, 
suits had been brought against Fred T. llarmon and Forest 
L. I-Iarmon, partners trading as Fred T. liarmon & 
page 3 }- Brother, in the Circuit Court for the Coupty of 
Accomack, Virginia, by Webb Packing Company 
and Millard C. Watson, respectively, alleging the two judg-
ments above mentioned as the basis of said suits in the County 
of Accomack, State of Virginia, residence of defendants; that 
on August 25, 1937, the same processes were again sent to 
Fred T. Harmon and Forest L. Harmon, partners trading as 
Fred T. Harmon & Brother, and same were, on August 26, 
1937, sent to you at Roanoke, Virginia; a· copy of letter en-
closing the said processes to you is herewith filed, marked 
''Exhibit B"; that on August 31, 1937, the undersigned re-
ceived a letter from you under the harid of P. R. Thornbury, 
Attorney, Legal Department, returning the said processes and 
denying coverage to the undersigned with respect· to said 
accident; 
That as result of your denial of liability, it then and there 
became necessary to retain counsel to represent the interests 
of the undersigned; that the undersigned retained as counsel 
the firm of Gunter & Gunter, and Jeff F. Walter and George 
L. Doughty, of the County of Accomack, Virginia; that it 
became n~cessary for the said counsel to go to the State of 
Delaware and there retain local counsel for the purpose of 
defending said suits; that there were retained in the State 
of Delaware, James M. Tunnell, of the firm of Tunnell & 
Tunnell, Attorneys-at-law, Georgetown, Delaware, and the 
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:firm of Ward & Gray, Attorneys-at-law, Wilmington, ·Dela~ 
·ware. 
That as a result of the actions taken by the said attorneys 
on behalf of the undersigned, the said suits were dismissed 
on December ·22, 1937 ; 
That the automobile described in the said policy of insur-
ance was the same automobile which was involved in the acci-
dent in the State of Delaware on December 6, 1933; 
That tl1e undersigned has performed all conditions of said 
policy and has violated none of its prohibitions; · 
That on account of the violations of the provisions of said 
policy by you in your failure to defend the said suits 
page 4} on ·which the processes were last served, the under-
signed has suffered dan1ages to the extent of $750.00. 
Given under my hand this 8th day of January, 1938. 
JEFF F. WALTER, 
GEORGE L. DOUGHTY, 
GUNTER & GUNTER, 
Attorneys. 
Exhibit '' B '' filed with Notice. 
FRED T. HARMON, 
by Counsel. 
EXHIBIT B. 
August 26, 1937. 
Farm Bureau J\tiutual Auton1obile Insurance Co., 
Roanoke, Virginia. 
Gentlemen: 
I am enclosing herewith processes received by me on Au-
gust 25,1937, in favor of Webb Packing Company and Millard 
C. Watson, respectively, issued in New Castle County, in the 
State of Delaware, directed to the Sheriff of J{ent County, 
Delaware, and forwarded to me by registered mail. These 
processes speak for themselves and are returnable the 17th 
day of September, next. 
The tr~ck which was in the accident complained of was 
o'vned by me and -insured in your Company, Policy No. 
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· 490-095, issued May 17, 1933. The accident on which these 
suits a.re based occurred in the State of Delaware on De-
. cember 6, 1933. I am giving you this notice in accordance 
with the provisions of the policy. 
Your representative has heretofore been here and talked 
with me and gotten the details from my standpoint. 
You will note that the processes are is~ued against F. T .. 
Harmon and F. L. Harmon, trading as Fred T. Fiarmon & 
Brother. 
Heretofore your attention was brought to these suits, on 
which judgments were entered at the January ter~, 1.935, and 
since vacated on my motion by the Superior Court 
page 5 ~ of New Castle County, Del., the docket number being 
~a . 
Very truly yours, 
G-p FRED T. HARJ\IION. 
Copy to Farm Bureau Mutual Auto Ins. Co., Baltimore, 
Maryland. 
Demurrer :filed February 22, 1938. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court for the County of Accomac. 
Fred T. Harmon 
'l,!. 
Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. 
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
DEMURRER. 
The said defendant says that the Notice of Motion in this 
action is not sufficient in law and states the Grounds of De-
murrer relied on to be as follows: 
1. Because the ·terms of the policy of insurance sued on 
are not alleged in the Notice of ~fotion for Judgment nor is 
' 
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the o1iginal policy or a sworn copy thereof filed with said 
Notice of Motion for Judgment. 
2. Because said Notice of 1\'Iotion for Judgment upon its 
face shows that the plaintiff ''failed, in accordance 'vith one 
of the provisions of said insurance policy'', to forward to the 
defendant company the copies of the processes sent to the 
plaintiff on the day of October, 1934, in the suit at that 
time pending in Newcastle County in the State of Delaware 
in favor of the Webb Packing Company, et al., against said 
plaintiff and another. 
OLOTER W. SMITH, 
MAPP & MAPP, p. d.· 
And on this same day, to-wit: 
Virginia: 
Circuit Court for the County of .Accomack, on Tuesday, 
the 22nd day of February, in the year of our Lord, Nineteen 
Hundred and Thirty-eight. 
page 6 ~ Fred T. Harmon , 
v. 
Farm Bureau l\futual Automobile Insurance Company. 
NOTICE OF 1IOTION FOR JUDG~IENT. 
On motion of defendant, by its counsel, leave is granted 
said (lefendant to file its demurrer to the plaintiff's notice 
of motion for judgment, and same is accordingly filed. 
Iri consideration whereof, the court doth order that said 
detnurrer as to the first ground thereof be, and the same here-
by is, overruled, and the court doth order that said demurrer 
as to the second ground thereof be, and the same hereby is, 
sustained. 
To the action of the court . in overruling the first gro1md 
of said demurrer, the defendant, by counsel, excepted, and 
to the action of the court in sustaining said demurrer as to 
the second ground thereof, tl1e plaintiff, by counsel, excepted. 
And it is further ordered that tlris cause be removed from 
the Trial Docket. 
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Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Accomack County. 
Fred T. Harmon 
'V. 
Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. 
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGJ\IIENT. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 1. 
Prior to the trial of this cause, to-wit, on the 22d day of 
February, 1938, the defendant, Farm Bureau Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Company, :filed a written demurrer to the 
notice of motion for judgment against it, said demurrer being 
as follows: 
The said defendant says that the Notice of 11:otion in this 
action is not sufficient in law and states the Grounds 
page 7 ~ of Demurrer relied on to be as follows: 
1. Because the ter.ms of the policy of insurance sued on ate 
not alleged in the Notice of Motion for Judgment nor is the 
original policy or a sworn copy thereof filed with said Notice 
of Motion for Judgment. 
2 .. Because said Notice of Motion for· Judgment upon its 
fa~e shows that the plaintiff ''failed, in accordance 'vith one 
of the provisions of said insurance policy", to forward to 
the defendant company the copies of the processes sent to 
the plaintiff on the day of October, 1934, in the suit at 
that time pending in Newcastle County in the State of Dela-
ware in favor of the Webb Packing Company, et al., against 
said plaintiff and another. 
The plaintiff joined in said demurrer, which demurrer was 
overruled by the Court as to the first ground, and sustained 
as to the second ground, to which action of the Court in sus- · 
taining said demurrer on the second ground, the plaintiff, by 
counsel, excepted; and to the failure of the Court to sustain 
the demurrer on the :first ground, the defendant, by counsel, 
ercepted. 
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'J;este: This the 6th day of April, 1938. 
Virginia: 
JNO .. E. NOTTINGHAM, 
Judge of the Circuit Court for the County 
of .Accomack, Virginia~ 
In the Circuit Court of Accomack County. 
Fred T. Harmon 
'V. 
Farm Bureau 1\futual Automobile Insurance Company. 
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 2. 
At the trial of this cause, to ... wit, on the 22nd day of Feb-
ruary, 1938, the Court entered the following order: 
page 8} This day came tl1e parties, by their attorneys, 
and thereupon, by leave of Court, the defendant 
filed its dennurer with grounds of same in writing, and the 
plaintiff joined in the demurrer. Whereupon, the said de-
murrer having been argued, it is considered by the Court 
that the same be sustained as to the second ground, and over-
ruled as to the first ground. And thereupon, the plaintiff, by 
his counsel, stating· that it is l1is desire to stand upon the 
notice of motion for judgment in its present form, it is fur-
ther considered by the Court that the defendant do recover 
of the plaintiff its costs by it in this behalf expended, to which 
ruling of the Court in sustaining said demurrer on the second 
ground the plaintiff, by counsel, excepted. 
And it being represented to the Court, by counsel, that 
the plaintiff is desirous of applying to the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of this State for a writ of error and s~tpersedeas 
to the judgment of this Court, it is further considered by the 
Court that the execution of this judgment be suspended for 
a period of sixty days, upon condition_ that the plaintiff, or 
some one for him, do enter into and acknowledge a bond in 
the penalty of$ , with surety approved by the Clerk 
of this Court, made payable to the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
and conditioned according to law. -
I . 
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To the entering of this order sustaining the demurrer filed 
by the defendant, on the second ground, and to the entering 
of :final judgment in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff, 
. by counsel, excepted, and to the failure of the Court to sus-
tain the said demurrer on the :first ground the defendant, by 
counsel, excepted. 
Teste : this the 6th day of April, '1938. 
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Virginia: 
JNO. E. NOTTINGHAM, 
Judge of the Circuit Court for the County of 
Accomack, Virginia. 
In the Circuit Court of Accomack County., 
Fred T. Harmon 
v. 
Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. 
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
It is agreed by counsel for plaintiff and counsel for de-
fendant that the original policy issued to Fred T. Harmon 
by the Farm Bureau ~Iutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
herein sued on, may be taken up by counsel for plaintiff to 




GEORGE L. DOUGHTY, . 
GUNTER & GUNTER, p. q. 
J. BROOICS 1\riAPP, p. d. 
Circuit Court of the County of Accomack, on Wednesday, 
the 6th day of April, in the year of our Lord, Nineteen Hun-
dred and Thirty-eight. 
Fred T. Harmon 
v. 
Farm Bureau Mutual .Automobile Insurance Company. 
I 
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NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
On this, the 6th day of April, 1938, came the plaintiff, by 
counsel, and tendered to the Court certain Certificates of Ex-
ception, numbered 1 and 2, taken to the action and rulings of . 
the Court upon the trial of this ca.use. 
And it appearing to the Court that the defendant has had 
written notice· of the time and place when such certificates 
were to be tendered and presented to the Court for signature, 
said certificates are signed, sealed and enrolled and 
page 10 ~ ordered to be made a part of the record, same being· 
done :within sixty days from the entering of the 
said final judgment complaine.d of. 
And at another day, to-wit: 
Virginia: 
Circuit Court of the County of Accomack, on Wednesday, 
the· 8th day of June, in the year of our Lord, Nineteen Hu~­
dred and Thirty-eight. 
Fred T. Harmon, Pltff., 
v. 
Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Deft. 
And it appearing to the Court that the plaintiff, Fred 'F. 
Harmon, desires to make application to the Supreme Court 
of Appeals for a writ of error from the final order entered in 
this case, then the Cle-rk, in making up the record, shall not 
copy into tp.e record "Exhibit A", filed with the notice of 
motion, but shall forward the said exhibit in its original form, 
in lieu of a copy of the same, to the Clerk of the Supreme 
Co.urt of Ap~eals of Virginia, at Richmond, :Virginia. 
State of Virginia, 
County of Accomack, to-wit: 
I, John D. Grant, Jr., Clerk of the Circuit Court for the 
County of .A.ccomack, in the State of Virginia, do hereby cer-
tify that the foregoing is a true transcript of the record and 
proceedings in the Notice of Motion for Judgment of Fred 
T. Harmon, plaintiff, against Farm Bureau Mutual Automo .. 
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bile Insurance Company, defendant, pending in said Court, 
with the exception of the insurance policy referred to as "Ex-
hibit A", which is forwarded along with this transcript in 
its original form in lieu of a copy of the same, pursuant to 
the order of said Court entered on the 8th day of June, 1938. 
And I further hereby certify that the attorney for the de-
fendant has been duly notified of the intention of the plain-
tiff to have the foregoing transcript of the record made out. 
The cost of the foregoing transcript is $7.90, and is 
eharged to the plaintiff. 
,JOHN D. GR.ANT, JR., Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. \VATTS, C. C. 
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